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[p. 355] 
The increasing relevance of copyright generated by academics within the 
managerial framework of universities 
The creation and exploitation of intellectual property rights that attach to the output of 
university academics becomes more and more relevant to the management of 
universities. Of central interest are still patents, but also copyright becomes 
increasingly important, and not only in relation to computer software. From a legal, 
not necessarily commercial, perspective, copyright is the most significant intellectual 
property right that applies to works of university academics. Copyright concerns all 
academic output, whether in the arts and humanities, the social sciences or the 
sciences. Patents are confined to certain activities in science and engineering only. 
Since the university academics as the authors of the copyright-protected works are 
employees of their university it is worth investigating as to who owns the copyright in 
the works created by academics1 and what the effects of university copyright (or 
intellectual property) policies on the relationship between academic-author and 
university-employer are. A recent study conducted by the present author on the 
management of copyright created by academics in UK universities2 showed that the 
presumed legal position in the university copyright policies does not necessarily 
coincide with the real legal situation. This article is confined to the law of copyright 
with regard to academics as university employees; a discussion of the potential legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See also the opinion by J. Pila, ‘Who owns the intellectual property rights in academic work?’ (2010) 
EIPR 32(12) 609-613.  
2 A. Rahmatian, ‘Make the butterflies fly in formation? Management of copyright created by academics 
in UK universities’, (2014) 34(4) Legal Studies, 709-735. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755532 
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problems with the copyright regulations which many university policies adopted can 
be found in the study.  
 
 
The legal position: copyright works and academics as employee authors 
University academics are mostly university employees und fall under the provision of 
s. 11 (2) of the CDPA 1988 in principle. The copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic work or a film made by an employee in the course of employment belongs 
to the employer as the first owner, subject to an agreement to the contrary. The 
employee remains author (differently from the works-made-for-hire doctrine in the 
US3) and also retains his/her moral rights, however, with restrictions.4 This scenario 
requires a discussion of the following matters for further analysis: (a) Which kinds of 
copyright-protected works do academics typically create? (b) When is there 
‘employment’ for the purpose of copyright? (c) What does ‘in the course of 
employment’ mean?  
(a) A creation is protected by UK copyright if it is recorded (in writing or 
otherwise) in some permanent form,5 and constitutes a ‘work’ that is ‘original’ within 
the meaning of copyright law. Potentially all classes of ‘work’ are open to academics’ 
creations and endeavours, but the practically most relevant ones are the literary work 
and artistic work categories. Academic books and articles, hand-outs, lecture notes 
(either for teaching preparation or for distribution in class), teaching material (for 
example for distance learning courses), reading lists, examination papers,6 course 
booklets and information materials, [p. 356] internet blog texts, oral speeches7 and 
lectures8 if recorded, are all protected as literary works.9 Works which derive from 
existing sources, such as translations, 10  editions and restorative editions of 
fragments,11 critical annotations, selections or abridgements,12 and earlier drafts13 can 
also attract copyright protection in their own right.14 Academics may also be engaged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 US Copyright Act 1976, 17 USC § 201 (b). 
4 CDPA 1988, s. 79 (3) (limitation of the employee’s right of attribution) and s. 82 (severe restriction 
of the employee’s integrity right). 
5 CDPA 1988, s. 3 (2). Strictly speaking there is no recording requirement for the artistic work 
(because the recording is inextricably intertwined with the nature of the visual arts in a broad sense 
anyway). 
6 University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601. 
7 Walter v. Lane [1900] AC 539. 
8 Caird v. Sime (1887) LR 12 App Cas 326, HL (Sc).  
9 CDPA 1988, ss. (3) (1).  
10 Byrne v. Statist [1914] 1 KB 622.  
11 Also in the context of musical works, see Sawkins v. Hyperion Records [2005] RPC 32, CA. 
12 Macmillan v. Cooper (1923) 93 LJPC 113. 
13 Sweeney v. Macmillan Publishers [2002] RPC 651. 
14 They are protected to the extent to which they do not infringe the pre-existing work (if they infringe 
at all), compare Ladbroke v. William Hill [1964] 1 WLR 273, at 291-292. See also Kenrick v. 
Lawrence (1890) 25 QBD 99, at 103-104. 
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in the development of computer programmes and (usually electronic) databases which 
would also be protected as literary works.15 The artistic works category is mostly 
relevant for maps, charts and other graphical representations (also on slides for 
teaching), plans and photographs – all of which are protected irrespective of artistic 
quality.16 Artistic works in the more traditional sense, such as paintings, sculptures, 
drawings, etchings, architectural plans and models17 are very important for art, design 
and architectural schools and art colleges. The categories of dramatic and musical 
works18 are essential for conservatoires or colleges of music and drama, but tend to be 
of limited relevance to universities. The ‘literary work’ category is unquestionably the 
most important one for any kind of academic output in the arts and humanities, social 
sciences as well as the sciences, because also science papers are literary works. 
University research and enterprise departments or similar administrative units usually 
concentrate on patents because of their focus on potential commercial exploitation. In 
fact, copyright (here particularly literary, and to some extent artistic, copyright) is 
substantially more relevant from an intellectual property lawyer’s perspective. 
The work, if recorded, must be ‘original’ to obtain copyright protection. 
Although normally a big topic in copyright law, it is of no relevance here because 
works of all sorts by academics qualify almost always as being sufficiently ‘original’ 
to attract protection. This is so whether one follows the traditional UK copyright 
definition of originality as being the author’s own skill, labour, judgement, effort, 
investment and so forth,19 or whether one adheres to the EU concept of originality as 
the author’s own intellectual creation, according to the originality criteria established 
by recent CJEU decisions.20 Thus the question whether these CJEU decisions have 
really substantially changed the UK approach to originality21 need not be decided 
here. Only for the purpose of completeness one may mention that sound recordings 
and films and other entrepreneurial works need not be ‘original’; it is sufficient if they 
are ‘not copied’.22 These types of work are relevant for podcasts, recordings of 
lectures and the like. 
Secondly, the author-academic would normally be the first owner of copyright 
in the work,23 but for the fact that he or she is typically an employee of a university. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 CDPA 1988, ss. 3 (1) (b) and (d), s. 3A. 
16 CDPA 1988, ss. 4 (1) (a) and (2) (a). 
17 CDPA 1988, ss. 4 (1) and (2). 
18 CDPA 1988, s. 3 (1). 
19 University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press, at 608-609 [1916] 2 Ch 601, Ladbroke v. 
William Hill [1964] 1 WLR 273, at 277-278, 281 for statements of the classical UK copyright position. 
20 These started with Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECDR 16 (Case C-
5/08).  
21 Discussion in: A. Rahmatian, ‘Originality in UK copyright law: the old “skill and labour” doctrine 
under pressure’ (2013) 44 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 4-34. 
22 CDPA 1988, ss. 5A (2), 5B (4), 6 (6), 8 (2). 
23 CDPA 1988, s. 11 (1). 
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The employee-copyright provision of s. 11 (2) requires an employment relationship as 
its basis, that is, the academic must be in a contract of service (employment contract), 
not under a contract for services.24 Mixed contracts, that is, relationships that are 
partly contracts for services and partly contract of service, may also exist,25 with a 
different result for copyright allocation: copyright created under the contract for 
services component certainly belong to the academic because for this part the 
employee-copyright rule of s. 11 (2) does not apply. 
Thirdly, however, the copyright in works created under a contract of service 
(employment contract) may not be owned by the employer either; that depends on 
whether the work has been created ‘in the course of employment’. If not, the 
copyright remains with the author-academic. As a general rule, a work has been made 
in the course of employment if the creation of the work is representative of the typical 
activities an employer can expect from his employee in view of the range of the 
established employee’s duties. The scope of this criterion is potentially wide, but in 
reality the English courts take a narrow view in their interpretation. Furthermore, the 
determination of employee’s duties is fraught with additional difficulties in the case 
of academics, by comparison to other employees. [p. 357] 
 
 
‘In the course of employment’: the narrow approach taken by the courts  
The principal decision for the interpretation of the requirement ‘in the course of 
employment’ is still the Court of Appeal case of Stephenson Jordan.26 The question 
was whether the employer company could claim copyright in the public lectures on 
cost control for business management which their employed accountant gave and 
wanted to publish subsequently as part of a book. The Court of Appeal ruled that the 
company had no copyright in these lectures because the lectures where not created in 
the course of the accountant’s employment. The delivery of the lectures was not part 
of the specific employee’s duties, and therefore the employer could not have ordered 
the employee to prepare and deliver them. The fact that the lectures were written, at 
least in part, in office hours and with the use of the company’s library and typed up by 
the company secretaries did not make them being created in the course of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This is to be determined according to employment law rules, see S. Deakin and G. S. Morris, Labour 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 5th ed., 2009), 121. See also Stephenson Jordan & Harrison v. 
MacDonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10, at 17, 22, and Performing Right Society v. Mitchell & Booker 
(Palais de Danse) [1924] 1 KB 762, at 766. 
25 Stephenson Jordan & Harrison v. MacDonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10, at 22. See also Waites v. 
Franco-British Exhibition (1909) 25 TLR 441, 24 March 1909, CA, to which Stephenson Jordan 
refers. 
26 Stephenson Jordan & Harrison v. MacDonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10. The case was decided 
under the old Copyright Act 1911, s. 5 (1) (b), but the law in CDPA 1988, s. 11 (2) is insofar the same 
today. 
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employment.27 The case has a particular importance for university academics, because 
the court gave the example of the university lecturer as an illustration of the ratio 
decidendi:28 
 
‘[P]rima facie I should have thought that a man, engaged on terms which include that he is 
called upon to compose and deliver public lectures or lectures to some specified class of 
persons, would in the absence of clear terms in the contract of employment to the contrary be 
entitled to the copyright in those lectures. That seems to me to be both just and commonsense. 
The obvious case to which much reference by way of illustration was made in the course of 
the argument is the case for the academic professions. Lectures delivered, for example, by 
Professor Maitland to students have since become classical in the law. It is inconceivable that 
because Professor Maitland was in the service at the time of the University of Cambridge that 
anybody but himself, one would have thought, could have claimed the copyright in those 
lectures.’ 
 
Thus even a university lecturer who is typically called upon to give lectures (unlike an 
accountant, as in Stephenson Jordan) will retain the copyright in his lectures by 
default. The underlying idea of this reasoning may also be that the employment duties 
require a university academic to teach and research in general terms, perhaps to 
publish,29 but not to carry out a determinable kind of research, ordered in advance as 
part of the employment duties, that is, to be expressed in a particular form capable of 
attracting copyright protection.30 In certain cases this argument can be effectively an 
application of the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law.31 Even if one assumes 
rather artificially that an academic is for example ordered by the employer to carry 
out research on employees’ copyright in relation to university academics, this task is 
an idea, a concept, a ‘storyline’ and cannot obtain copyright protection. Only the 
particular form of presentation, the specific text, the expression (such as the wording 
of this particular article), will be protected and can therefore become subjected to the 
employee’s copyright ownership rule of s. 11 (2).  
This idea-expression dichotomy argument is a possible teleological 
interpretation of the court ruling, but it is not a necessary, and certainly not 
comprehensive, interpretation. One can more generally state that the courts normally 
regard the classical academic activities of lecturing (if recorded) and of publishing 
academic works as being outside the course of employment. The narrow approach in 
Stephenson Jordan had a predecessor in Byrne v Statist,32 and was confirmed in Noah 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., at 18, 19-20, 22-23. 
28 Ibid., at 18. 
29 That depends on the jurisdiction. In Germany, the publication of research is not within the duties of a 
university academic as an employee, see S. Rojan in W. Schricker, Urheberrecht. Kommentar 
(München: C. H. Beck, 3rd ed., 2006), s. 43, notes 31 and 63. 
30 W. R. Cornish, ‘Rights in university innovations: the Herchel Smith lecture for 1991’ [1992] EIPR 
13, at 15. See also A. Rahmatian, n. 2 above, at 716. 
31 On the idea-expression dichotomy in general, see e.g. L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual 
Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2014) 212. 
32 Byrne v. Statist Company [1914] 1 KB 622. 
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v. Shuba,33 as well as in a patent case which can be seen as equivalent in relation to 
the present issue.34 However, the result in individual cases depends much on the 
specific facts: in Software v. Magee,35 software written outside work time and on the 
employee’s own equipment was nevertheless held to be created in the course of 
employment, because the employee was employed to write programs of the kind at 
issue.  
In the case of academics’ works one also has to distinguish between the types 
of work academics create to ascertain (or presume) copyright ownership. Core 
‘academic works’, such as books, articles, book chapters, individual lecture notes for 
the preparation of the teaching in the lecture theatre, critical editions with 
commentary, texts written from the position of academic expertise for a more general 
readership, 36  artistic or scientific pictures or photographs, musical scores (in 
traditional, modern or individual notation systems), sound recordings of 
compositions, and bespoke computer programmes developed for specific academic 
research projects (in physics, chemistry etc.) are presumed to be in the academic’s 
ownership, following Stephenson Jordan. Notes, memos, and any other material 
generated by academics in the course of their administrative duties [p. 358] within the 
university system belong to the university as employer.37 A grey area are learning and 
teaching materials (for example for distance-learning courses), lecture hand-outs, 
slides for visual pedagogical support of lectures, course booklets and student 
information brochures in relation to courses, university examination papers and 
teaching podcasts.38 One can consider such works as falling within the course of 
employment of an academic, because they form part of the academic’s specific 
teaching duties. There is no clear guidance by the courts, and the outcome of a case 
would presumably depend heavily on the individual facts (duties stated in the 
employment contract, when and under which circumstances was the preparation of 
the work in question, e.g. at home and on weekends, and which resources were used; 
is the work required standard or an initiative by the individual employee, and so on).39 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Noah v. Shuba [1991] FSR 14.  
34 Greater Glasgow Health Board’s Application [1996] RPC 207, at 223. 
35 Software v. Magee [1989] FSR 361. 
36 The typical examples are the subject-specific internet blog or the newspaper comment by an 
academic. Where the academic writes texts which are not related to his or her expertise, such as poetry, 
that work is outside the course of employment in any case. 
37 See e.g. Nora Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd. [1973] FSR 33. 
38  Copyright in the sound recording of a lecture by an academic, made by students without 
authorisation (see CDPA 1988, s. 3 (3)), arguably belongs to the lecturer, because the sound recording 
only acts as a fixation of the literary work of the lecture which is itself normally outside the course of 
employment. 
39 See Stephenson Jordan & Harrison v. MacDonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10; Noah v. Shuba 
[1991] FSR 14. 
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The university may avoid such grey areas by requesting from the academic an 
all-encompassing assignment of copyright in all present and future works, for 
example, when the new academic signs the employment contract. The general rule of 
CDPA 1988, s. 11 (2) can be overridden (‘subject to any agreement to the contrary’), 
but the assignment is only valid if the formality requirements of CDPA 1988, s. 90 (3) 
are complied with.40 The first problem with such an approach is political-sociological: 
the ensuing alienation (also in a sociological sense) is not popular with academics, 
and usually there is great reluctance among academics and their trade unions to agree 
to such a general assignment policy. The second problem is technical-legal: an 
assignment presupposes that the university does not assume that it is, as the employer, 
the initial owner of copyright generated by their employees, so this is an admission 
that s. 11 (2) does not normally apply to works by academics. If s. 11 (2) did apply, an 
assignment were superfluous and void, because it would be the assignment of 
copyright from a non-owning individual (academic/employee) to the owner 
(university/employer). Such an implicit concession by insistence on an assignment 
can weaken the argumentative position of universities considerably; even if a 
university requires academics to assign their copyright as a condition for employment, 
it will soon run into difficulties when recruiting new staff. In any case, whether the 
university is the initial owner of copyright according to s. 11 (2) or obtains copyright 
through an assignment, the university would have to establish a central, and efficient, 
office dealing with the publishers of academics who seek a vast number of 
assignments and licences as the typical precondition for the publication of academics’ 
books and articles. The managerial challenges for the university administrations 
would be interesting to watch. 
 
 
The confused position of typical university intellectual property policies in the UK 
The struggle, legal and managerial, with the application of s. 11 (2) in relation to 
university academics became apparent in the study by the present author.41 The study 
showed that almost all university IP policies presumed that s. 11 (2) applies without 
restriction, thus that the university is initial owner of all the copyright its academics 
generate.42 From what has been said before, this is highly problematic and in this 
generality arguably incorrect. But, whether because of logical inconsequence or a 
secret concern that matters may not be so straightforward in law, university policies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 That is, it must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the assignor. It is interesting to note that even 
academic publishers often do not abide by these formality rules – not really to the chagrin of the 
academic who would normally have to the give the assignment for free anyway. The possibility of an 
implied assignment (or licence) cannot be discussed here: see e.g. Durand v Molino [2000] ECDR 320. 
41 A. Rahmatian, n. 2 above, 709-735. 
42 Ibid., n. 2 above, 725. 
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often contain curious additional rules, such as that the university chooses ‘not to 
claim’ or ‘not to assert’ copyright in core scholarly works like books and articles 
(often with the proviso that this does not apply to works which are commercially 
relevant), or that the university as owner grants a licence to the academic for 
(effectively) unrestricted use of the work he/she created, or that the academic acts as 
agent for the university as owner in agreements with third party publishers, or that 
core academic works are excluded from the definition of ‘IP’ of the policy in question 
which means that the IP policy does not apply to scholarly books, articles and so on. 
The legal implications of such rules can be chaotic.43 The legal assessment of a ‘non-
assertion of copyright’-clause alone is a complicated matter for the lawyer.  
Given that copyright generated by university academics is largely irrelevant in 
commercial terms, the insistence of universities on ownership of copyright in 
employee-academics’ works is rather surprising. The real reason seems to be an 
increasing obsession with university managerialism that seeks to conceptualise a 
human employee as an objectified ‘human asset’ and looks to copyright as one 
possible device to assess the academics’ work as a sum of proprietary units 
(copyright-protected works) which can be evaluated, priced and audited, and so the 
economic efficiency of that individual can be ascertained. This follows the current 
trend of university managers that regard universities as just other forms of business 
corporations which sell knowledge products by content providers and learning 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This is discussed in detail in ibid., n. 2 above, at 723, 726-730.  
44 Ibid., n. 2 above, at 711-712, 735; A. Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property 
Rights in Creative Works (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 252, 263-264. 
